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Abstract
We explore the eﬀect of local information sharing among consumers on
market functioning. Consumers are embedded in a consumers network, they
may costly search non-sequentially for price quotations and the information
gathered are non-excludable along direct links. We first show that when search
costs are low consumers randomize between searching for one price and two
price quotations (high search intensity equilibrium). Otherwise, consumers
randomize between searching for one price and not searching at all (low search
intensity equilibrium). In both equilibria consumers search less frequently in
denser networks. The main result of the paper shows that when search costs
are low the expected price and the social welfare increase, while the consumer
surplus decreases, as the consumers network becomes denser. These results are
reverse when search costs are high.
JEL classification numbers: D43, D83, L15
Key Words: networks, local externalities, non-sequential search.
Consumers Network and Search Equilibria∗
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1 Introduction
A large body of empirical work shows that in the market a variety of informal rela-
tionships complement the price system in coordinating the interaction among buyers
and sellers. For example, in marketing it is well established that consumers obtain
much of their information via their social contacts (Feick and Price (1986, 1987)).
In relation to this, firms have increasingly recognized the need for using informal
channels as a way to market their products. The practice of consumers referral is an
example;2 according to the Direct Selling Association (1999), annual sales of firms
that rely entirely on consumer referral grew from 13 billion to nearly 23 billion dol-
lars between 1991 and 1998. Similarly, in the process of finding a job people heavily
rely on their social contacts in order to obtain information about job opportunities
(Granovetter (1974)). In medicine, and other specialized fields, professional networks
shape the adoption of new technologies (Coleman 1966).
These examples share a common feature: informal relationships connecting agents
transform the information that each individual privately obtains into a public good,
and this aﬀects players’ incentives as well as aggregate outcomes. This fact represents
the primary motivation for the development of a theory where both networks and
markets mediate externalities across individuals. This paper focuses on the role of
local information sharing in shaping the information available in the economy, firms’
pricing behavior, social welfare and consumer surplus.
We examine a duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). On the supply
side of the market there are two firms producing a homogeneous good. Firms set
prices so as to maximize profits. Consumers have a common willingness to pay for
the good and buy at most a single unit. The only way for a transaction to take place
is that consumers have some information about prices. Consumers may search non-
sequentially for price quotations and, in this case, they must pay a fixed search cost
for each price quotation observed.3 In addition, consumers are embedded in a social
∗I am grateful to V. Bhaskar, K. Burdett, G. Conti, S. Goyal, M. Janssen, S. Mutuswami and
J.L. Moraga-Gonzalez for useful comments on earlier versions of the paper. I also thank seminar
participants at University of Essex, Caltech and ESRC Research Seminars in Game Theory-UCL.
2Firms provide diﬀerent sorts of benefits such as discounts to clients who bring new customers.
3Morgan and Manning (1985) show that non-sequential search is appealing when consumers find
it optimal to gather price information quickly. See Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2003) for a variety
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network and they share information freely with their direct neighbors. To maintain
symmetry on the consumers side we assume that each consumer holds the same
number of connections, say k.4 Once each consumer has searched, the information
observed is freely provided to his direct neighbors and then transactions take place.
The game is a one-shot simultaneous move game: firms set prices and consumers
decide how many searches to make at the same moment. We focus on symmetric
Nash equilibria.5
When the network is empty (or inactive), i.e. k = 0, we obtain the duopolistic ver-
sion of Burdett and Judd (1983). By contrast, the possibility of sharing information,
i.e. k > 0, creates information externalities across consumers. These externalities
have two main eﬀects on market competitiveness. On the one hand, for given con-
sumers’ search eﬀorts, they increase the likelihood with which a consumer compares
prices, thereby increasing firms’ competition. On the other hand, they create incen-
tives for consumers to free-ride on each other. The magnitude of these two opposite
eﬀects determines the intensity of firms’ competition and therefore the overall func-
tioning of the market. We shall show that when search costs are suﬃciently low, the
total information generated in the economy decreases with the connectivity of the
network. In such a case, firms charge on average higher prices and consumers surplus
is lower.
We start by noticing that equilibria exhibit price dispersion.6 More interestingly,
for any positive degree of the network there are two types of price dispersed equilibria.
The first is a high search intensity equilibrium, where consumers randomize between
searching for one price and for two prices. This equilibrium exists for low search
costs. The other is a low search intensity equilibrium, where consumers randomize
between searching for one price and not searching at all, and it exists for moderate
search costs. By contrast, when consumers do not share information (the network is
empty) only the former equilibrium is strategically viable. The low search intensity
equilibrium arises because even a consumer who does not search may observe two
price quotations, thereby creating the tension between some consumers over which
firms have monopoly power and others consumers over which firms compete for. In
what follows we discuss the properties of these equilibria.
Let us first comment on the high search intensity equilibrium. Given that the
degree of the network is strictly positive, this equilibrium exists for suﬃciently low
search costs. Further, as the degree of the network increases, the existence region
of this equilibrium shrinks. The intuition is that richer network relationships reduce
the marginal gains of searching twice instead of once. Thus, for suﬃciently high
of oligopolistic markets where consumers search non-sequentially.
4Thus, the consumer network is a regular graph with degree k.
5We shall discuss strategy profiles where consumers search asymmetrically in Section 6.
6More precisely, we show that pure strategy equilibria exist and they take the following form:
consumers do not search and firms charge a suﬃciently high price. In the rest of the introduction
we focus the discuss on symmetric mixed strategy equilibria.
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search costs, consumers cannot be indiﬀerent between the two searching alternatives.
Second, we show that the equilibrium expected price is higher when the network is more
dense. The intuition is based on two considerations. On the one hand, an increase in
the degree of the network increases information externalities across consumers, ceteris
paribus. Since consumers compare prices more often, firms’ competition augments.
On the other hand, consumers react to an increase in the number of connections by
free-riding more on each other. This decreases information externalities. Since, for
suﬃciently low search costs, consumers always search, their incentives to free-ride on
each others is so strong that overall firms’ competition becomes less severe.
Thirdly, we show that social welfare is higher, while consumer surplus is lower,
when the consumers network is more dense. The increase in social welfare is due
to the strategic substitutability between searching and network degree, and to the
fact that consumers are active with probability one. The former eﬀect reduces the
waste in search costs, while the second ensures that, in equilibrium, each possible
transaction is indeed realized. The decrease in consumer surplus is due to the fact
that firms price less aggressively when consumers hold more connections.
We finally turn to discuss the low search intensity equilibrium. This equilibrium
exists for moderate search costs; further, for a given regular network, the lowest search
costs for which this equilibrium exists equals the highest search cost for which the
high search intensity equilibrium exists. Secondly, in sharp contrast with the previous
equilibrium, an increase in the degree of the network lowers the expected equilibrium
price. The intuition behind this result is that when search costs are moderate, a
consumer who free-rides may not observe even one price. This has a substantial im-
pact on the utility of the consumer and as a consequence it mitigates consumers’
free-riding. As a result, richer consumers connections make consumers more likely to
compare prices and this enhances firms’ competition. Even if network relationships
are beneficial for consumers, i.e. consumer surplus increases, they decrease social wel-
fare. The reason is that the number of realized transactions in equilibrium decreases,
an eﬀect which oﬀsets the saving on search costs.
The present model relates to two branches of the economic literature: the theory
of networks and the search theory. We start by discussing the contribution of this
paper to the theory of networks. The massive empirical documentation of network
eﬀects is behind the increasing theoretical attention of the eﬀect of decentralized
interactions on a variety of settings.7 All these studies belong to a new general class
of games in which the economic activity of players is embedded in a network, which
aﬀects non trivially their incentives. In this perspective, the main contribution of the
current paper is the study of the interplay between consumers information sharing
7For example, Calvo and Jackson (2004a, 2004b) study of the eﬀect of social networks on em-
ployment and inequality. Bala and Goyal (1998) examine the eﬀect of network on learning. Kranton
and Minehart (2000,2001) study buyer and seller networks. Goyal and Joshi (2003) investigate the
eﬀect of networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Ballester, Calvo and Zenou (2004) study the impact
of networks in criminality activities.
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and market functioning. Even if our model is quite stylized, it illustrates new and
important insights which arise when both networks and markets mediate externalities
among individuals.
The works which come closer to mine are Bramoulle and Kranton (2003) and
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). Bramoulle and Kranton (2004) examine a model
of social learning where individuals search costly for new information and the results
of their searching are non-excludable along links. While in their model the benefit
each consumer obtains by searching is exogenously given, in the present paper it is
the outcome of firms’ competition. Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) analyze a
game where, prior competition, firms form pairwise agreement for the development
of new products and they set an R&D eﬀort which is costly and provide a reduction
of the marginal production cost. They find that the R&D eﬀort a firm chooses in
each agreement is decreasing in the eﬀort that the partner firm sets and that this
free-riding eﬀect may lead to ineﬃcient market outcomes. While Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2001) focus on the impact of network relationships on the supply side of
the market, the current paper focuses on information externalities across consumers.
The consumer search literature is well established in economics.8 We have already
discussed above the relation between the present paper and the model of Burdett and
Judd (1983). Another paper which comes close to mine is Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2003). They study a version of Burdett and Judd (1983) where consumers
are ex-ante heterogeneous: one fraction of consumers are fully informed, while the
remaining fraction must search costly to obtain price information. Increasing the frac-
tion of fully informed consumers creates positive externalities for all consumers by
boosting competitiveness and therefore lowering the expected price. The present pa-
per provides a simple way of endogenizing information externalities across consumers
using network relationships and it shows that this may create negative consumers
externalities.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we define formally the
model. Section 3 provides a preliminary equilibrium analysis. Section 4 and 5 char-
acterize equilibria. Section 6 briefly discusses asymmetric equilibria and Section 7
concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
We examine a model of non-sequential search where consumers are embedded in a
network of connections. On the supply side there are N = 2 firms producing a
homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. We normalize their identical unit
production cost to zero, without loss of generality.
On the supply side instead, there is a finite number of consumers, which we denote
8See, among others, Anderson and Renault (2000), Bester (1994), Braverman (1980), Burdett
and Coles (1997), Morgan and Manning (1985) and Stahl (1989,1996).
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as m. All consumers are identical. They want to buy a single unit of the product and
their maximum willingness to pay is p˜ > 0. For a transaction to take place, consumers
must observe at least one price quotation. A consumer may search simultaneously,
the cost for each search being c > 0, where c < p˜. In addition, the price information
each consumer obtains is freely provided to his neighbors.9 For the sake of symmetry
on the consumers side, I assume that the consumer network is a regular graph. Thus,
the degree of the network, say k, may vary between 0 to m− 1, and it represents the
number of connections each consumer holds.10
We note that, when k = 0, the model is equivalent to a duopolistic version of
Burdett and Judd (1983). By contrast, as k becomes positive, consumers strate-
gically choose their search intensity, taking into account that the information their
neighbors obtain is non-excludable along direct links. This clearly aﬀects the individ-
ual incentives and, therefore, the market equilibrium outcomes. It is exactly on the
interplay between the externalities produced by the consumers network and market
performance that we focus in the present paper.
Firms and consumers know the architecture of the network and play a simultane-
ous move game. An individual firm chooses its price, taking the price choices of its
rivals, as well as consumers’ search behaviors as given. We denote a firm’s strategy by
the price distribution F (p) defined on a support σ; let p and p¯ be the lowerbound and
the upperbound of σ, respectively. Consumers form conjectures about the firms’ price
behavior and decide how many price observations to pay for. Once each consumer has
searched, information is transmitted to the immediate neighbors. A strategy profile
for a consumer is then a probability distribution over the set {0, 1, 2} .11 We denote
as qi,x the probability of consumer i to search x time; thus a consumer’s strategy
is {qx}x∈{0,1,2} . We will primarily consider symmetric Nash equilibria. Asymmetric
equilibria are discussed in Section 6.
3 Preliminary Analysis
Let us first analyze the existence and characterization of equilibria in which consumers
adopt symmetric pure strategies.
Proposition 3.1. For any k ≥ 0 and c > 0, the only equilibria in which
consumers use a symmetric pure strategy take the following form: consumers never
9It is worth noticing that we are making the following two assumptions. The first is that in-
formation transmission is perfect along direct links. The results we shall present will qualitatively
hold when relaxing this assumption. The second is that we do not allow for indirect information
sharing. This assumption simplifies our analysis and it allows us to study systematically the eﬀect
of an increase in information sharing on market functioning.
10A regular graph may not exist when m is odd. Hence, in the paper we assume that m is even.
11It is clear that the restriction of the consumers’ strategy set to {0, 1, 2} does not aﬀect the equi-
librium characterization. Indeed, for a consumer to search more than twice is a strictly dominated
strategy.
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search, q0 = 1, and firms charge a price p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜] .
The proof relies on two facts. One, if consumers search surely for one price quota-
tion, they either prefer to decrease their search activity (if search cost are suﬃciently
high) or to search more (otherwise). Two, if consumers search surely for two price
quotations, firms’ competition will drive prices to marginal cost. This creates incen-
tive for consumers to search less. This proposition pushes us towards investigating
those equilibria in which consumers use a mixed strategy. The next proposition shows
the possible candidates for an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. In any equilibrium in which consumers employ a symmetric
mixed strategy firms price accordingly to an atomless price distribution, F (p) , defined
on a convex support σ. Moreover, if k = 0 then q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1), while if
k > 0, then either q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) .
There are two main observations which follow from Proposition 3.2. The first is
that, despite the fact that consumers are fully homogenous, price dispersion arises in
all equilibria. Since consumers search randomly, some consumers in the market are
ex-post more informed than others. In line with Burdett and Judd (1983), this allows
firms to extract profits by randomizing their prices. Second and more interestingly,
when the network does not play any role, e.g. k = 0, consumers must randomize
between searching for one price and two prices for an equilibrium to be obtained. We
refer to this as high search intensity. However, when local information sharing is taken
into account, another equilibrium candidate emerges where consumers randomize
between searching once and not searching at all. We call this possibility low search
intensity. The intuition for this is that the presence of network relationships allow
that, with some probability, even consumers who do not search at all observe both
firms’ prices. This creates the tension between some consumers over which firms have
monopoly power and others consumers over which firms compete for.
We shall now characterize the high search intensity equilibrium and low search
intensity equilibrium. For each equilibrium candidate we first characterize firms’
behavior, taking consumers’ strategy as exogenous. In this way, we illustrate the
direct eﬀect that networks have on the strategic way firms price. Next, we endogenize
consumers’ behavior in order to characterize equilibria. Finally, we analyze the impact
of network density on the consumers’ search intensity, firms’ pricing behavior, social
welfare and consumer surplus. Taken together, this analysis will clarify the eﬀect of
local information sharing on market competitiveness.
4 High search intensity
Suppose consumers randomize between searching once and searching twice, i.e. q1 +
q2 = 1, q1, q2 > 0. The expected number of consumers who observe only the price of
firm i, say Di, and the expected number of fully informed consumers, say Di,j, can
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be written as
Di (k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
(1)
Di,j (k, q1) = m
µ
1− q
k+1
1
2k
¶
(2)
A consumer obtains only the price of firm i (expression (1)) when he and all his
neighborhood observe only the price of firm i, (q1/2)k+1. Further, a consumer observes
only the price of firm j with the same probability that a consumer observes only the
price of firm i, i.e. Di = Dj; with the remaining probability (expression (2)), a
consumer observes both prices.
Using (1) and (2), the expected profit to firm i is
Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Di (k, q1) pi +Di,j (k, q1) pi [1− F (pi; k, q1)] (3)
The next Proposition summarizes equilibrium pricing by firms, given the con-
sumers’ behavior fixed.
Proposition 4.1. Assume q1 + q2 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 1, 2. In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q1) = 1−
qk+11
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢ p˜− p
p
, ∀p ∈ [ q
k+1
1
2k+1 − qk+11
p˜, p˜]
Furthermore, F (p; k, q1) dominates in the first order stochastic sense F (p; k + 1, q1) ,
k = 0, ...,m− 1.
Proposition 4.1 shows that it is possible to rank the price distributions with respect
to k in the first-order stochastic sense: F (p, k, q1) first order stochastically dominates
F (p; k + 1, q1) . Therefore, as k increases, firms charge on average lower prices. The
intuition is as follows: when consumers hold more connections, information external-
ities are higher, ceteris paribus. This implies that consumers compare prices more
often and thereby firms compete more. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium price
distribution for diﬀerent levels of network density.
K=0
K=1
K=2
Figure 1. Price distribution high search 
intensity equilibirum
p
F(p)
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We now endogenize the consumers side. We denote as E(p) the expected price
obtained by randomly sampling one price from the distribution of prices F, while
Emin(p) indicates the expected minimum price obtained by randomly sampling two
prices. The expected utilities to a consumer from the two distinct searching alterna-
tives are:12
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k
¶
Emin (p)− c (4)
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c (5)
In words, an arbitrary consumer j who searches once, expression (4), observes
only one price quotation when all his social contacts are searching once, qk1 , and each
of them observes the same price quotation that j observes, 1/2k.With the remaining
probability consumer j is fully informed. In equilibrium a consumer should be indif-
ferent between the two diﬀerent search alternatives, i.e. Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) .
This leads to the following equilibrium condition:
qk1
2k
[E (p)− Emin (p)] = c (6)
Each consumer trades-oﬀ the marginal cost of searching once more, c, with its
marginal gain. The marginal gain of searching twice instead of once is the diﬀerence
between buying at the expected price and at the expected minimum price, i.e. E(p)−
Emin(p),weighted for the probability with which a consumer who searches for one price
will indeed observe only one price quotation, i.e. qk1/2
k. When the network is empty,
i.e. k = 0, the marginal gain becomes the diﬀerence between the expected price and
the expected minimum price.
The next result provides the full characterization of the high search intensity equi-
librium for any given k = 0, ...,m−1. Let c¯ (k) = 1
2k(2k+1−2)
³
2k+1
2k+1−2 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2
´
.
Theorem 4.1. If k = 0 there exists a c˜ > 0 such that for any c ∈ (0, c˜) a stable
high search intensity equilibrium exists where firms behave according to Proposition
4.1 and q∗1 is the smallest solution of (6). If k > 0, there exists c¯ (k) < c˜ such that
for any c ∈ (0, c¯ (k)) a high search intensity equilibrium exists where firms behave
according to Proposition 4.1 and q∗1 is the unique solution of (6). Furthermore, this
equilibrium is stable.13
We first elaborate on the existence condition of this equilibrium. Figure 2a below
illustrates the equilibrium condition for diﬀerent level of k. In the Figure we plot the
12More precisely expression 4 (resp. 5) indicates the expected utility to a consumer j who searches
for one price quotation (resp. for two price quotations), given that all other consumers are search-
ing for one price quotation with probability q1, and for two price quotations with the remaining
probability, 1− q1.
13We refer to the notion of stability used by Fershtman and Fishman (1992).
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LHS of expression (6) for diﬀerent level of k as a function of q1. Figure 2b above
illustrates that the function c¯ (k) decreases in k.
c(k)
Figure 2b.
k
K=0
c(1)
c(2)
K=1
K=2
Figure 2a.
q1
As already discussed, when k = 0 the model is equivalent to the duopolistic
version of Burdett and Judd (1983). In this case, for a given c ∈ (0, c˜) there are
at most two equilibria, but only the equilibrium with high search intensity, i.e. the
smallest q1, is stable.14 Diﬀerently, when we introduce information sharing, there is
a unique solution of the equilibrium condition (6), which is also stable. The first
eﬀect of information sharing is that the high search intensity equilibrium exists only
when searching is relatively inexpensive. Furthermore, as k increases this equilibrium
exists for smaller and smaller search costs. The intuition is as follows. Network
externalities reduce the marginal gains of searching twice instead of once, thereby
for search costs suﬃciently high a consumer cannot be indiﬀerent between the two
searching alternatives. The decrease in the marginal gains is due to two eﬀects. The
first is that richer network connections increase the probability of a consumer who
searches once to compare prices, and the second is that the diﬀerence between the
expected price and the expected minimum price decreases in k.
We now turn to analyze the eﬀect of consumers network on search incentives, ex-
pected prices, consumer surplus and social welfare. The next proposition summarizes
the findings.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose we move from k to k+1, k ∈ [1, ...,m− 2] and assume
that c < c¯ (k + 1). Then: (a) consumers search less frequently, i.e. q2 decreases,
(b) expected price increases (c) social welfare increases and (d) consumer surplus
decreases.
We would like to elaborate on three aspects of Proposition 4.2. The first is that
14To see this let us assume that c ∈ (0, c˜) and let q∗1 be the highest value of q1 which solves the
equilibrium condition (6). In a neighborhood to the left of q∗1 , say q1 < q∗1 , the marginal revenue
for a consumer to search twice instead of once is higher than the respective marginal cost. Thus,
consumers would search more intensively and we will move further away from equilibrium. A similar
argument can be invoked for the case in which q1 is slightly bigger than q∗1 .
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consumers search intensity decreases as the network becomes denser: an increase in
the network degree leads consumers to free-ride more on each other. Secondly, this
has a somewhat surprising eﬀect on the equilibrium pricing behavior of firms: expected
price is higher in settings where consumers have more connections. The intuition is
the following. An increase in the degree of the consumers network induces two eﬀects.
The first is highlighted in Proposition 4.1 and it tells us that, keeping constant the
consumers’ behavior, an increase in the number of connections increases the expected
number of fully informed consumers. The second is a free-riding eﬀect: more connec-
tions lead players to search less intensively, thereby decreasing the expected number
of fully informed consumers. When consumers search intensively, the free-riding ef-
fect oﬀsets the former eﬀect and as a consequence firms price less aggressively. In
Figure 3a below we plot the probability of a consumer who searches once to be fully
informed in equilibrium. In line with the intuition above, Figure 3a shows that for
a given search cost the information in the market decreases when the degree of the
network increases. Figure 3b shows how the expected price varies with respect to the
degree of the network in equilibrium.
Next, we note that consumer surplus decreases. This follows by noting that not
only the expected price decreases but the same holds for the expected minimum
price. Finally, we show that an increase in the degree of the network enhances social
eﬃciency. This is due to the fact that the free-riding eﬀect leads to saving on the total
search cost, yet, since consumers search surely, each possible transaction is realized
in equilibrium.
K=3
K=2
K=1
K=3
K=2
K=1
Probability of being fully 
informed
Expected Price
Figure 3a. Figure 3b. cc
5 Low Search Intensity
We now analyze the case in which consumers randomize between searching once and
not searching at all, i.e. q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 > 0. We start by considering consumers’
behavior as exogenously given. The expected fraction of consumers who observe only
the price of firm i, say Di, is:
10
Di (k, q0) =
m (1− q0)
2
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
(7)
+mq0
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
,
while the expected fraction of fully informed consumers, say Di,j, is:
Di,j (k, q0) = m (1− q0)
Ã
1−
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
(8)
+mq
Ã
1− qk0 − 2
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
The interpretation of expression (7) is as follows: the first term denotes the fraction
of consumers who have searched once on their own and found firm i, i.e. m(1−q0)/2,
and that they have either received the same information or no information from their
neighbors; the second term indicates the fraction of consumers who did not search, but
that have received the price information of firm i from some of their social contacts.
Expression (8) as a similar interpretation. The expected profit of firm i is:
Eπ (pi, pj; k, q0) = Di (k, q0) pi +Di (k, q0) pi [1− F (pi; k, q0)] (9)
The next Proposition summarizes the firms’ price behavior in equilibrium.
Proposition 5.1. Assume q0 + q1 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 0, 1. In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q0) = 1−
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2
³
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
´ p˜− p
p
,
∀p ∈
"
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2k+1 − (1 + q0)k+1
p˜, p˜
#
Furthermore, F (p; k, q0) dominates in the first order stochastic sense F (p; k + 1, q0).
As in the high search intensity equilibrium, an increase in the degree of the network
has a direct eﬀect on the way firms price: the higher the density of the network, the
lower the expected price. This is illustrated in the Figure 4 below.
11
K=1
K=2
K=3
Figure 4. Price distribution low search 
intensity equilibirum
p
F(p)
We now endogenize the consumers’ search behavior. Let α (q0, k) =
Pk
x=0
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x
and β (q0, k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢ qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x−1 ; the expected utility a consumer gets from the two
distinct search alternatives is:
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜− α (q0, k)E (p)− (1− α (q0, k))Emin (p)− c (10)
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− β (q0, k)E (p)− (11)
−(1− qk0 − β (q0, k))Emin (p)
The interpretation of expression (10) is the following. Since a consumer searches
once on its own he always buys: he buys at the expected price whenever his neighbors
provide redundant or no information; otherwise he buys at the expected minimum
price. Diﬀerently, a consumer who does not search, expression (11), buys only when
at least one of his social contact searches,
¡
1− qk0
¢
.
In equilibrium every consumer must be indiﬀerent between searching once and not
searching at all, i.e Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q0 = 1) . This condition is satisfied if and only
if:
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] + qk0 (p˜−Emin (p)) = c (12)
The interpretation of (12) is similar to the interpretation of (6). The next result
shows that for moderate value of search costs there exists at least a stable low search
intensity equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. For any k > 0 there exists a c˜ such that for any c ∈ (c¯ (k) , c˜) a
stable low search intensity equilibrium exists where firms behave according to Propo-
sition 5.1 and q∗0 is the smallest solution of (12).
Theorem 5.1 tells us that for moderate search costs there exists at least a stable
solution of the equilibrium condition (12). The proof in the appendix also shows that
there always exists at least another solution of the equilibrium condition (12), which
however is not stable. Further, numerical simulations reveal that these are the only
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two possible solutions. In what follows we focus on the stable equilibrium. We start
with a discussion of the existence of the low search intensity equilibrium. In Figure
5 below we plot the LHS of the equilibrium condition (12) with respect to q0 for
diﬀerent levels of k.
K=1
K=2
K=3
C(1)
C(2)
C(3)
Figure 5.
q0
We note that for any positive k the stable low search intensity equilibrium exists
for search costs which are higher than c¯ (k) .Moreover, when the search cost is exactly
equal to c¯ (k) in equilibrium consumers search once with probability one and the low
and high search intensity equilibrium coincide.15
We now turn to examine the local comparative statics with respect to k. The
intractability of the equilibrium condition (12), leads us to rely on numerical simula-
tions. The findings are summarized in the following remark. 16
Remark 5.1. Suppose we move from k to k + 1 and assume that c ∈ (c (k) , c˜).
Then: (a) consumers search less frequently, i.e. q0 increases, (b) expected price de-
creases, (c) social welfare decreases and (d) consumer surplus increases.
The numerical simulations confirm that consumers free-ride more on each other
in denser networks. However, in sharp contrast with the high search intensity equi-
librium, the eﬀect on market competitiveness is reverse: the higher the density of
the network, the lower the expected price. The reason behind this diﬀerence is that
in the low search intensity equilibrium if a consumer free rides on others (does not
search) he may not be able to buy at all. This risk disincentives consumers from
free-riding. Thus, when the degree of the network increases the expected number of
15It is readily seen that the price distributions in Proposition 4.1 and 5.1 and the equilibrium
conditions (6) and (12) coincide when q1 = 1 (i.e. q0 = 1).
16We have run simulations for k = 1, ...,m − 1, for diﬀerent value of m. For any (k,m) we first
determine the range of the search costs for which the stable equilibrium exists (the smaller solution
of (12)), say [c1(k), c2(k)]. Next, for each c ∈ [c1(k), c2(k)], we derive the stable solution of equation
(12), q0 (k, c). Finally, using this value we compute the expected price , social welfare and consumer
surplus.
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fully informed consumers in the economy increases. As firms compete more often for
consumers, they charge on average lower prices. Figure 6a below shows the expected
equilibrium price for diﬀerent network degrees. Figure 6b illustrates the equilibrium
probability of not searching for diﬀerent network degrees.
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Figure 6a.
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c c
Next, we note that total social welfare is decreasing in the density of the network.
Figure 6c plot the social welfare for diﬀerent degrees of the network. Again, the reason
is that a consumer who completely relies on his connections takes the risk to be ex-post
completely ignorant about prices. In such a case a transaction does not take place
and this generates substantial welfare losses from the society standpoint. When the
degree of the network increases this negative eﬀect dominates the realized savings in
search cost. Interestingly, even if social welfare decreases, consumers surplus increases
in the density of the network. Figure 6d depicts the consumer surplus for diﬀerent
degrees of the network. Two are the driving forces for this result. The expected
price and expected minimum price decrease in the density of the network. Further,
the overall increase of information shared in the network leads consumers to be more
likely to compare prices.
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6 Discussion: asymmetric strategies
So far we have focused on symmetric strategy profiles. It is worth noting that, under
such restriction, the equilibrium characterization is insensitive to the (symmetric) al-
location of links; that is the characterization of symmetric equilibria is equivalent for
every regular network of degree k. Exploiting this property, we can study, by means of
comparative static, how local information sharing aﬀects market functioning.17 Can
we say something about asymmetric equilibria? In what follows we provide an ex-
ample which illustrates the nature of equilibria where consumers employ asymmetric
pure strategies. We shall note that when considering asymmetric strategies, even
in symmetric graphs, the way that links are allocated across consumers matters for
equilibrium.
Consider a population composed of 8 consumers. Figure 7 depicts two symmetric
networks with equal degree 4. The network on the LHS represents a social structure
with overlapping neighborhoods, while the graph on the RHS represents a social
structure where each consumer has links with their immediate neighborhood as well
as more distant links (short-cuts). A black node indicates a consumer who searches
once, while a white node an inactive consumer.
Overlapping 
Neighbourhoods
Short-cuts
Figure 7.
It is possible to show that the depicted pattern of consumers’ search in each of
the network is the only possible pattern for an asymmetric equilibrium to exist. It is
also easy to show that an equilibrium exists where firms price randomly in both situ-
ations. There are three remarks worth doing. The first is that in both networks only
specialized equilibria exist: some consumers search once (expert consumers), while
others do not search at all (free-rider consumers). This contrasts with the findings
17We would like to emphasize that the model can be re-interpreted in the following way. Consider
the game introduced in Section 2, but, instead of assuming that consumers are embedded in a
network, let us assume that each consumer, before choosing if and where to buy, receives price
information from k randomly sampled consumers. It is easy to see that the results provided so far
apply to this new setting and that they provide a complete equilibrium characterization of the game.
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of Bramoulle and Kranton (2004), who show that also distributed equilibria arise.18
The reason for these diﬀerences is that in the current paper the benefits of searching
depend on firms pricing behavior, while in their paper the benefits are exogenously
given. This reduces dramatically the multiplicity of equilibria Bramoulle and Kran-
ton (2004) obtain. Second, when the network has overlapping neighborhoods a fewer
number of experts arise in the economy as compared to the case where consumers have
also short-cuts. This is a consequence of the following equilibrium property: experts
can only be linked with free-riders.19 This suggests that the maximum number of
experts which can be sustained in equilibrium is somewhat negatively related to the
clustering (the number of trials) of a network. Third, in both networks we have price
dispersed equilibria, which again arise because consumers are ex-post asymmetrically
informed.
In this specific example, we can then ask how the diﬀerent allocation of links
across consumers aﬀect strategic pricing, consumers’ welfare and social welfare. It
is easy to show that the equilibrium price distribution for the short-cuts network
first order stochastic dominate the one associated with the overlapping neighbors
network.20 Therefore expected prices are lower in the former case as compared to the
latter. Note that the presence of short-cuts allow for the emergence of more experts
in the economy which in turn increases firms’ competition. It is also possible to show
that aggregate consumers welfare is higher in the presence of short-cuts as compared
to overlapping neighborhoods.21 This is because the increase on firms’ competition
due to the higher number of experts dominates the associated increasing in the total
search cost. Finally, it is readily seen that social welfare is higher in the network with
overlapping neighborhoods because the total search cost is minimized and yet each
transaction takes place.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a simple search model which studies the eﬀects between networks
and markets in mediating externalities among economic agents. Even if quite styl-
ized, the model provides new and interesting insights. It shows that an increase in
information sharing generates two important eﬀects. The first is that, if consumers’
search eﬀort remains the same, firms will price more aggressively as more consumers
18Roughly speaking a distributed configuration in this model is one where there are consumers
who search surely but with diﬀerent search intensities.
19Formally, the set of experts in equilibrium must form a maximally independent set. Given
a graph g an independent set is a set of nodes which are not directly connected. A maximally
independent set is an independent set which is not a proper subset of any other independent set.
20Formally, the equilibrium price distribution in case of the overlapping neighborhoods network
is FO(p) = 1 − (9/2)(v − p)/p, ∀p ∈ [(9/11)v, v] . In the case of the short-cuts network FS(p) =
1− (17/14) (v − p) /p, ∀p ∈ [(17/31)v, v] .
21To see this note that the aggregate consumers surplus in the case of overlapping neighbors is
csO = 9 ln 119 − 1− 2c, which in the case of short-cuts is csS = −
1
2 +
34
7 ln
31
17 − 4c.
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are fully informed. The second eﬀect is that consumers free ride on others, thereby de-
creasing firms’ competition. The magnitude of these two opposite eﬀects determines
market competitiveness. We find a systematic relation between the level of search
costs and the eﬀect of information sharing, which crucially relies on the risk con-
sumers face when they free-ride. Specifically, when search costs are suﬃciently low,
in equilibrium consumers always search, which implies that free-riding is relatively
inexpensive. This creates high incentives to free-ride and therefore an increasing in-
formation sharing is detrimental for consumers. As soon as search costs become high
enough, for an equilibrium consumers will not search with positive probability. In
turn, this disincentives consumers to free-ride on each other.
There are many extensions which may be of interest for further research. The
first is to examine sequential search: consumers search and observe a price quotation
and then they decide whether to search more (Stahl 1989). While when the network
is empty there exists a unique equilibrium where consumers surely search for one
price quotation, it is easy to show that as soon as consumers can exchange some
information a low search intensity equilibrium arises for suﬃciently high search costs.
The study of how market competition varies with network degree is an open question.
A second extension would be to endogenize the quality of information sharing. It is
natural to think that the quality of each link and therefore how information flow
from one consumer to the other depends on the time the two parties are willing to
invest on. In this new settings one could investigate the strategic nature between
network investment and private search investment and the implications on market
functioning. Third, it is interesting to generalize the model to an oligopoly. Clearly,
the magnitude of the two eﬀects we have mentioned above will depend on the number
of firms present in the market. While in the current paper the focus is on the eﬀect
of an increase in network connectivity on market competitiveness, a natural question
would be to ask what happens when the market becomes less concentrated. Finally,
one could investigate the role consumers networks play in shaping the incentive of
firms to generate information, for example advertising. When firms must decide their
advertising strategy they face the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand advertising
increases the demand of a firm, on the other hand it increases firms’ competition and
therefore it reduces prices. These two eﬀects will likely depend on the architectural
properties of consumers networks.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
First, it is easy to verify that the strategy profile {p, q0 = 1} , where p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜]
is a Nash equilibrium. I now prove that these are the only (generic) equilibria in
which consumers employ pure strategies. There are two possibilities, which I analyze
in turn. First, suppose q1 = 1; if k = 0, then each consumer will observe only one
price and as a consequence firms will charge p = p˜. However, as far as c > 0, a
consumer strictly gains by not searching at all. Consider then that k > 0; I claim
that if this were an equilibrium then firms would price according to an atomless
price distribution F (p) defined on a convex support σ. The reason is that since
k > 0 and q1 = 1 there is a fraction of consumers which will observe both firms’
prices with a strictly positive probability. Therefore, if firms charge a price p with
a mass point, they will tight at that price with strictly positive probability, but
then an individual firm has a strict incentive to undercut the atom. I now show
that, given k > 0, an equilibrium where consumers search once with probability
one, i.e. q1 = 1, exists for a unique value of the search cost, i.e. it is not generic.
The utility to a consumer is Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜ − 12kE (p) −
¡
1− 1
2k
¢
Emin (p) − c. In
equilibrium it must be the case that Eu (q1 = 1) ≥ Eud (qx = 1) , x = 0, 2, where
Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜− 12k−1E (p)−
¡
1− 1
2k−1
¢
Emin and Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c.
Solving the two inequalities I obtain that:
c =
1
2k
(E (p)−Emin)
Second, suppose q2 = 1 and k ≥ 0. It is easy to see that each consumer will observe
always two prices. If this were an equilibrium firms would charge the competitive
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price, p = 0. However, a consumer is strictly better-oﬀ by searching only once. This
completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
Proof Proposition 3.2.
I first show that firms price according to an atomless price distribution F (p) . If
k = 0 the model degenerates to the duopoly version of Burdett and Judd (1983) and
the claim follows. Next, assume k > 0 and suppose there exists some price p∗ with
a mass point. Since consumers search at least once with some positive probability
and k > 0, it follows that a fraction of consumers observe two prices with strictly
positive probability. Therefore, firms would tie at the price p∗ with strictly positive
probability; in such a case a firm gains by undercutting p∗. This is a contradiction.
I finally show that for any k ≥ 0 the support σ must be convex. Suppose not, i.e.
∃σ˜ Ã σ : F (p) = η ∀p ∈ σ˜, η ∈ [0, p˜] . Let p∗ = inf σ˜, then a firm charging p∗ gains
by increasing such price. This completes the proof of the first part of the Lemma.
I now show that if k > 0 in any equilibrium either q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or
q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) . I start by claiming that q0 + q2 = 1 cannot be part
of an equilibrium. Suppose it is, then firms would set the competitive price with
probability one. The reason is that the expected demand of a firm derives from
two sources: consumers who search on their own and consumers who do not search
but obtain information from their social contacts. The former would always observe
two prices, while the latter either do not observe any price or they also observe two
prices. Using a standard undercutting argument it follows that firms must charge the
competitive price. Since firms charge the competitive price with probability one a
consumer strictly benefits by searching only once.
Next I show that q0 + q1 + q2 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Suppose it
is an equilibrium; the same argument above implies that F (p) is atomless and it is
defined on a convex support σ. In equilibrium it must be the case that Eu (qx = 1) =
Eu (qy = 1) , x, y = 0, 1, 2. Let α (k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 qx1
2x
, then I obtain that:
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− α (k)E (p)−
¡
1− qk0 − α (k)
¢
Emin (p)
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
µ
qk0 +
α (k)
2
¶
E (p)−
µ
1− qk0 −
α (k)
2
¶
Emin (p)− c
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜− Emin (p)− 2c
Solving for the equilibrium conditions it follows that:
qk0 [p˜−E (p)] = qk0 [E (p)− Emin (p)]
Given that q0 > 0 this condition is satisfied if and only if p˜−E (p) = E (p)−Emin (p).
I now show that this is impossible. To see this I note that
Emin (p) = 2E (p)−
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp
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Therefore:
E (p)−Emin (p) =
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp−E (p) =
Integrating by parts I can show that:Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp = p˜−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp
which implies that:
E (p)− Emin (p) = [p˜−E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)] (13)
This is a contradiction and therefore the claim follows. Hence, the proof for the case
k ≥ 1 is complete.
I finally consider the case where k = 0. The same argument used for k ≥ 1, shows
that q0+ q2 = 1 and q0+ q1+ q2 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, the
only possibility left is q0 + q1 = 1. If this were an equilibrium firms would charge the
monopolist price. However, in such a case consumers cannot be indiﬀerent between
not searching and searching once, i.e. Eu (q0 = 1) = 0 > −c = Eu (q1 = 1) . This
completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
High Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
I first note that the upper bound of the price distribution must be the reservation
price, p˜; for otherwise a firm charging p < p˜ strictly gains by increasing it. This
implies that the expected equilibrium profit is: Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
p˜. In equi-
librium a firm i must be indiﬀerent between charging any price in the support σ,
i.e. Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) , ∀p ∈ σ. Solving this condition I obtain the
expression of F (p; k, q1) and the expression of the lowerbound of the support is ob-
tained by solving for Eπi
³
p
i
, pj; k, q1
´
= Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) . Finally, let ψ =
qk+11
2(2k−qk+11 )
,
then it is easy to see that ∂F (p;k,q1)
∂k
> 0 if and only if ∂ψ
∂k
=
qk+11 2
k−1
(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
q1
2
< 0. This
completes the proof.¥
Proof Theorem 4.1.
The proof of the case k = 0 is the same as Burdett and Judd(1983) and therefore it
is omitted. I focus instead in the case k > 0.
Let us define the RHS of expression (6) as φ (p; k, q1) =
qk1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] . I start
by showing that ∂φ(p;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0. Suppose, without loss of generality that p˜ = 1. Using
the expression of the price distribution F (p; k, q1) defined in proposition 5.3. I can
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invert it to obtain:
p (z; k, q) =
1
g (z; k, q1)
(14)
where
g (z; k, q1) = 1 +
2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
qk+1
(1− z) (15)
I now note that:
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) = 2
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1)) dp−
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1)dp
Integrating by parts yields,
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) =
Z 1
p(k,q1)
[F (p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1))] dp
Using the inverse function p (z; k, q1) , I can write this expression as:
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
£
p
¡√
z; k, q1
¢
− p (z; k, q1)
¤
dz
Or,
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
Let a = qk+1, b = 2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
and c = 2k+1 (2k + 1) , then,
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
=
Z 1
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
= −
Z 1\2
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (1− 2z)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz +
+
Z 1
1\2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
I note that [ka(2z−1)+c(1−z)]
[a+b(1−z)]2 is positive and increasing in z for any z ∈ (0, 1/2) and that
[a+ b (1− z)]2 is decreasing in z. Therefore:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1\2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz+
Z 1
1\2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
22k
dz
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I now note that [ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] is positive and it is decreasing in z, which
implies that:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1\2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz +
Z 1
1\2
qk+11 k (2z − 1)
22k
dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
Next, I note that limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and that limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) = c (k) . The facts
that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0, limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) = c (k) imply that for
any c ∈ (0, c (k)) there exists a unique solution, say q∗1 ∈ (0, 1) , of the equilibrium
condition (6), i.e. φ (p; k, q∗1) = c.
I finally show that consumers do not want to deviate. Given that all consumers
randomize between searching once and twice, the expected utility to a consumer who
deviates by not searching at all is:
Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k−1
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k−1
¶
Emin (p)
For an equilibrium it must be the case that Eud (q0 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the
expression (4) it follows that this deviation is not profitable if and only if:
c ≤ q
k
1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]
This condition is always satisfied because in equilibrium c = q
k
1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]. This
completes the proof of the Theorem. ¥
Proof Proposition 4.2.
I recall that the RHS of the equilibrium condition (6) may be written as:
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
qk1
2k
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
First, I show that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0. The derivative of φ (z; k, q1) with respect to k is:
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂k
= −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln
2
q1
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz +
+
q2k+11
2k
ln q1
Z 1
0
qk+11 (2z − 1)
2£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2dz
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I note that the second term of this expression is weakly negative and that −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln 2
q1
is also weakly negative. Therefore it is suﬃcient to show that:
ξ =
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz > 0
To see this note that:
ξ = −
Z 1/2
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z) +
+
Z 1
1/2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z)
Since
µ
qk+11 +2(2k+1−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)
[qk+11 +2(2k−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)]
2
¶
is increasing in z for z ∈ (0, 1/2) and
£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤
is decreasing in z, then:
ξ > −
Z 1/2
0
µ
2k+1
22k
¶
(1− 2z) +
Z 1
1/2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
22k
!
(1− 2z)
Furthermore, qk+11 +2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z) is also decreasing in z, which implies that
ξ > −
Z 1/2
0
2k+1
22k
(1− 2z) +
Z 1
1/2
qk+11
22k
(1− 2z) =
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
The fact that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0 and that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0 implies that if k increases then q1
must also increase.
Second, I show that if k increases, then expected prices increase as well. Let ψ (k, q1) =
qk+11
2(2k−qk+11 )
, then the expression of the price distribution defined in Proposition 4.1 can
be rewritten as:
F (p) = 1− ψp˜− p
p
To prove the claim it is enough to show that:
dψ
dk
=
∂ψ
∂k
+ ψ
∂q1
∂k
> 0
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I denote φk (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂k and φq1 (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂q1. Using the equi-
librium condition φ (k, q1)− c = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem I can
derive
∂q
∂k
= − φk (·)
φq1 (·)
where
φk (k, q1) = −
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] + q
k
1
2k
ψk[(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
φq1 (q1, k) =
kqk−11
2k
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] + q
k
1
2k
ψq1 [(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
Plugging the expressions ∂q1
∂k
in dψ
dk
, I obtain that
dψ
dk
=
ψ
φq1
µµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−1
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶¶
Since φq1 and ψ (q1, k) are strictly positive it follows that
dψ
dk
> 0 if and only ifµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
> 0
Computing the derivatives ψk = −
qk+11 2
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
2
q1
and ψq1 =
(k+1)qk12
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 it follows
that: µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
=
q2k1
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢2 ln 2q1 > 0
Furthermore, using the expression of ψ (k, q1) I obtain that:
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2 = 2
k
2k − qk+11
ln
Ã¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
qk+1
!
− 2 >
>
2k
2k − 1 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2 >
> −2 + 2 ln 3 > 0
This proves the claim.
Third, I show that social welfare increases as k increases. To see this note that for a
given k, the social welfare is SW (k, q1, c) = p˜− q1c− (1− q1) 2c = p˜− 2c+ q1c; since
when k increases, q1 increases then social welfare increases as well.
Finally, I show that the consumer surplus decreases as k increases. To see this note
that the consumer surplus is CS = Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜ − Emin (p) −
2c. Given he price distribution F (p; k, q1) , the distribution of the minimum price
25
is Fmin (p; , k, q1) = F (p; k, q1) (2− F (p; , k, q1)) . Using the expression for F (p; k, q1)
illustrated in proposition 5.3, I obtain Fmin (p; , k, q1) = 1 − ψ2
³
p˜−p
p
´2
. Therefore
∂Fmin(p;,k,q1)
∂k
< 0 if and only if dψ
dk
> 0, which follows from above. This completes the
proof.¥
Low Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
I first note that for an equilibrium p = p˜; for otherwise a firm charging p¯ < p˜ strictly
gains by increasing such price. Second, note that expressions (7) and (8) can be
rewritten as follows
Di (k, q0) =
m
h
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
i
2k+1
(16)
Di,j (k, q0) =
m
h
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
i
2k
(17)
Using (16) and (17), expression 9 and the fact that p = p˜, it follows that the expected
equilibrium profit is Eπ∗ =
³
m
³
(1 + q)k+1 − 2k+1qk+1
´
/2k+1
´
p˜. In equilibrium it
must be the case that Eπ (p) = Eπ∗ ∀ p ∈ σ. Solving the equilibrium conditions
I obtain the expression for F (p; k) . Similarly, the expression of the lowerbound is
the solution of Eπ
¡
p
¢
= Eπ∗. Finally, let ψ (k, q0) =
(1+q0)
k+1−2k+1qk+10
2(2k(1+qk+10 )−(1+q0)
k+1)
; then to
prove the first order stochastic dominance relation it is enough to see that ∂ψ(k,q0)
∂k
=
[2k(1−qk+10 )(1+q0)
k+1(ln(1+q0)−ln 2)+2kqk+10 ((1+q0)
k+1−2k+1qk+10 ) ln(q0)]
2(2k(1+q(k+1))−(1+q)k+1)
2 < 0.¥
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Without loss of generality let p˜ = 1. Using the expression of the price distribution
F (p; k, q0) defined in proposition 5.4, I can invert it to obtain:
p (z, k, q0) =
1
g (z; k, q0)
(18)
where
g (z; k, q0) = 1 +
2k+1
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− 2 (1 + q0)k+1
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
(1− z) (19)
Using (18) the equilibrium condition (12) can be rewritten as follows:
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (2z − 1) dz+qk0
µ
1− 2
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (1− z) dz
¶
= c
(20)
I denote as ρ (z; k, q0) the LHS of 20 and I note that:
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lim
q0→0
ρ (z; k, q0) = c¯ (k)
lim
q0→1
ρ (z; k, q0) = 0
Furthermore, I note that limit when q0 goes to zero of the derivative of ρ (z, k, q) is
positive:22
lim
q0→0
∂ρ (z; , k, q0)
∂q0
= 1
Hence, since ρ (q0, k) is positive at q0 = 0, increasing in the neighbor of q0 = 0 and it
is zero at q0 = 1 it follows that for any k > 0 there exists a c˜ > c¯ (k) such that for
any c ∈ [c¯ (k) , c˜] There exists at least two solutions of the equilibrium condition (12).
It is easy to see that among these two solutions only the smaller one is stable.
I finally show that a consumer does not have an incentive to deviate. The expected
utility to a consumer who deviates by searching twice is:
Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c
For an equilibrium it must be the case that this deviation is not profitable, i.e.
Eud (q2 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the expression (??) I obtain that Eud (q2 = 1) ≤
Eu (q1 = 1) if and only if:
c ≥ (1 + q0)
k
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]
Using the equilibrium condition (12), I can rewrite this inequality as
E (p)−Emin (p) ≤ p˜− E (p)
In the proof of proposition 5.2 I have shown that:
E (p)− Emin (p) = [p˜−E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)]
Hence, given that all consumers randomized between searching once and not searching
at all, a consumer does not want to deviate by searching twice. This completes the
proof.¥
22I develop the result using the program Mathematica. To do this I compute the following transfor-
mation. Let ρq0 (q0, k) =
∂ρ(q0,k)
q0 , then limq0→0 ρq0 (q0, k) = e
limq0→0 ln(ρq0 (q0,k))
q0
. The computation
is avaialable upon request of the author.
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